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Abstract
Background: As performance-based financing (PBF) has been increasingly implemented in low-income countries, a
growing literature has developed, assessing its effectiveness and, more recently, focussing on the political dynamics
of PBF introduction and implementation. This study contributes to the latter body of literature by exploring decision-
making processes on PBF in Sierra Leone during the 2010–2017 period. Sierra Leone presents an interesting case
because of the ‘start-stop-start’ trajectory of PBF.
Methods: The qualitative case study is based on a document review and 25 key informant interviews with national
stakeholders and international actors. Documents and interviews were analysed based on a political economy framework
focusing on actors and structure, but also making use of concepts drawn from interpretive policy analysis to look at
frames.
Results: Our analysis describes the process of negotiation and re-negotiation of PBF in Sierra Leone, highlighting the role
of different players, both internal and external, their ideas, capacity and power relations, and the shifting narratives around
PBF. It is shown that external actors driving the debate make use of ‘frames’, both actual (i.e., defining the timing and
pace of the discussions, the funding available, etc.) and metaphorical (i.e., how PBF is interpreted, defined and
understood) to fit in and influence the debate. This is facilitated by the lack of capacity and resources in
the fragile setting. Other strategies, such as ‘venue shopping’ are employed, though they may add to
fragmentation in the volatile context.
Conclusions: The retrospective view of the study has an analytical advantage, but findings are also relevant
to guide practice. Although power relations and rent-seeking issues are difficult to overcome in resource and
capacity-constrained settings, more attention could be paid to other elements. In particular, adopting shared
frames to ensure a common and inclusive understanding of technical concepts such as PBF may be useful
to ensure the political sustainability of reforms. Also, the ‘actual frames’ which define negotiation and
implementation should remain flexible, allowing for disrupting events (e.g., the Ebola epidemic in Sierra
Leone) as well as for time to develop national capacity and ownership in order to ensure longer-term
political support and better health system integration.
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Background
Performance based financing (PBF) programmes are in-
creasingly implemented in many low income countries and
in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, including in fragile set-
tings [1, 2]. Although models and terminology slightly
change from one setting to another, a common understand-
ing of the core features and design of PBF programmes has
emerged and has been codified [1, 3]. The World Bank has
particularly contributed to this process, and is also the
major funder of PBF programmes, largely through the
Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF), funded by
the British and Norwegian governments [4].
Despite the rapid growth, the pattern of diffusion of PBF
in low income settings has not been without shifts and
setbacks, both theoretical and operational. The theoretical
understanding of PBF has evolved over time, moving from
a focus on health workers’ motivation and provider pay-
ment mechanisms, with an emphasis on performance (as
evidenced, for example, in the name of the Trust Fund) to
a more comprehensive understanding of PBF as (an elem-
ent of) a broader health system reform [5] and as a poten-
tial entry point for strategic purchasing [6]. At the same
time, critiques of PBF have emerged focusing both on
specific aspects, such as the potential for crowding out of
intrinsic motivation [7, 8] as well as more broadly on the
lack of impact, high costs, and weak theory of change [9–
11]. Witter [12] identified different ‘effects’ that PBF may
be building on, and on which different actors may be in-
terested to focus their attention on their understanding
and description of PBF. These include:
 Incentive effect – modifying health workers and
managers’ behaviour through rewards and sanctions;
increased focus on results;
 Income effect – getting resources to the front-line;
 Autonomy effect – greater freedom to manage
resources at the front-line;
 Accountability effect – clearer roles and
responsibilities; increased transparency through use
of data; better evidence on what facilities and health
workers are doing;
 Intrinsic rewards effect – better management support
and supervision; constructive feedback and support.
At the operational level, recent research has docu-
mented the policy processes and the trajectory of PBF
adoption and implementation in low-income settings
[2, 13–15]. These studies have highlighted different pat-
terns in each context, with some countries able to scale
up PBF nationally such as Rwanda and Burundi [16].
Others have successfully transitioned from external to
national implementation agencies as in Cameroon [17],
and in others PBF was discontinued after piloting as in
Chad [18].
The present study adds to this growing but still limited
literature by presenting the case of Sierra Leone. It ex-
plores the policy and decision-making processes on PBF
in a retrospective manner covering the post-conflict,
Ebola and post-Ebola periods, from 2010 to the end of
2017. The experience of Sierra Leone has not been
documented so far. However, it represents a particularly
useful and relevant case study because PBF was imple-
mented at national scale (one of the few countries in
sub-Saharan Africa) and also because of the “start-stop--
start again” trajectory that PBF has followed over time.
Our analysis examines the role of the drivers of the pol-
icy process, including national and external actors, their
interests, agendas, and dynamics between them, in inter-
action with the features of the context. However, it also
explores how the evolving framing and understanding of
a technical concept such as PBF, driven by the global
evolution in PBF's theoretical understanding but also by
local dynamics, has influenced the policy trajectory. The
aim of the study is to unpack what has happened in
Sierra Leone concerning PBF, how and why. We build
on these findings to reflect on the role and the current
practices of external organisations, and how they could
be shaped to support policy processes in ways that allow
building consensus, ensuring national ownership and
promoting the long-term political sustainability of
reforms, in particular in (institutionally) fragile settings.
Methods
The research is based on a qualitative case study which
draws on a document review and a series of key inform-
ant interviews.
Documents collected are mostly grey literature and pol-
icy documents relating to PBF (e.g., operational manuals,
presentations, reports, PBF reviews, blogs, etc.) and to the
broader health system in Sierra Leone (e.g. health system
strategies, evaluations and reviews, situation analyses, pol-
icies on human resources for health and maternal, repro-
ductive and child health, health priorities and recovery
plans, meeting reports, etc.). They were collected through
our involvement in country over the last years, but also by
asking key informants to provide the documents they
mentioned during the interviews. Additionally, targeted
internet searches on relevant websites (e.g., World Bank's
RBF website, WHO, Cordaid) were also carried out. In
total, 68 documents were retrieved.
Key informant interviews were carried out in Novem-
ber 2017 in Freetown or via Skype for those abroad. Eth-
ics approval for primary data collection was obtained
from Queen Margaret University’s Ethics Board, as well
as the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Com-
mittee. Interviewees were purposefully selected among
the stakeholders involved in PBF in Sierra Leone with
the aim to be as comprehensive as possible. Key staff in
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the relevant bodies working on PBF or involved in the de-
bates around it were identified building on previous work
and contacts in country, as well as by asking interviewees
to suggest others. Potential respondents were contacted via
email or telephone or in person during meetings. Because
the interviews took place in Freetown, sub-national actors
are underrepresented in this sample. Additionally, a few of
those contacted, in particular among the international ac-
tors, did not reply and their views were not included in this
analysis. In total, 25 key informant interview were carried
out with government staff at central level from the Ministry
of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) and other relevant public
bodies (n = 9), MoHS staff at district level (n = 4), donors
and NGOs (n = 7), and technical advisers (TAs) both to do-
nors and to the MoHS (n = 5). Interviews were recorded
and transcribed verbatim for analysis. Additionally, we draw
on the findings from previous studies [19–21], and
re-analysis of interviews carried out for those studies in
March and September–November 2013 and April 2014,
which included the national level but also district and
facility levels. Given the involvement of all co-authors in
the policy landscape in Sierra Leone since around 2012, dir-
ect observation of the dynamics concerning health
financing, human resources for health and PBF, for ex-
ample, by participating in meetings between the MoHS and
development partners or in the discussions during
in-country dissemination of our previous findings, also pro-
vided a source of information for this study.
The data collected and analysed (or re-analysed) in this
work focused on the processes that led to the adoption, im-
plementation, discontinuation and then re-introduction of
PBF in a retrospective way covering the period from 2010
to 2017, to investigate not only what had happened, but
also how and why.
Data analysis of both oral and written sources takes a
political economy approach, looking at the dynamic and
evolving interaction between actors, their interest,
agendas, relative power and influence, perceptions on PBF
design and implementation (including success, challenges,
changed roles and responsibilities, compensation for those
changes, impact on rent-seeking, etc.) with the broader
structure (historical legacies, political, economic and epi-
demiological context, key events, etc.) [22]. However, go-
ing beyond the traditional political economy approach
and following Cairney’s ‘complementary’ approach [23] to
combine insights from multiple theories to explain a case,
our analytical framework also adopts concepts and per-
spectives drawn from interpretive policy analysis [24] and
in particular framing theory and frame-critical analysis
[25]. This allows us to include frames (alongside agency
and structure) into the picture of the variables which
interact to shape the policy process (Fig. 1) and to observe
how frames, ideas, meanings, narratives and names (in
our case, of the ‘technical’ concept of PBF) are constructed
and co-constructed among actors during the agenda
setting and policy development processes. A recent review
of the literature on framing in health policy [26] has iden-
tified a nascent scholarship and highlighted the potential
value of constructivist and interpretative approaches for
health policy analysis, therefore confirming the import-
ance of adopting framing, as theory and as methods, to
gather insights into the forces shaping political debates in
the healthcare arena.
Data were analysed using a framework approach [27],
based on a list of pre-developed codes which reflected the
main elements of the analytical framework (Fig. 1). Because
our retrospective approach covers a long period of time
(2010–2017) during which PBF was debated, designed,
Fig. 1 Analytical framework for the analysis of the policy process on PBF in Sierra Leone, looking at the interplay of agency, structure and frames
Bertone et al. Globalization and Health           (2018) 14:99 Page 3 of 15
implemented and again debated in Sierra Leone, in order
to be comprehensible to the reader, the ‘results’ section is
initially organised in chronological order to detail the more
than half decade-long policy process. We then focus on the
elements of the analytical framework to explain how they
acted and interacted to influence the policy process. Anon-
ymised quotes are provided. To preserve anonymity,
respondents are described only as “governmental” (national
and district level actors, and TAs seconded to government)
and “non-governmental” actors (donor/NGO staff and
TAs/consultants working directly with them).
Results
The policy process: Decision-making on PBF (2010–2017)
In this section, we provide a description of the policy
processes that underlie the adoption, design and imple-
mentation of PBF since 2010. Our analysis suggests that
the longer-term policy making process can be divided
into four key periods.
Introduction of the concept of PBF in Sierra Leone (2010–
2011)
In September 2009, the then President of Sierra Leone an-
nounced the launch of the Free Health Care Initiative
(FHCI), which introduced fee exemptions for pregnant
women, lactating mothers and children under five. The
FHCI represented a key turning point in the health sector
in Sierra Leone. It sparked a fervent, if rushed, process to
prepare its implementation (which started in April 2010)
and to design a series of corollary policy measures. An earl-
ier analysis of that process [19] found that, during the FHCI
preparation, the idea of introducing PBF (alongside provid-
ing funding for it) was brought to the table by the World
Bank.1 This was done through the Human Resources for
Health Technical Working Group (HRH TWG), led by the
HRH Directorate of the MoHS, which was in charge of co-
ordinating the FHCI-related reforms associated with HRH.
The introduction of PBF was seen as one of the options to
compensate for loss of (formal and informal) income of fa-
cilities, increase health workers’ income and motivate them
to deal with the expected increase in workload after the
FHCI reform. The alternative option, which was technically
and financially supported by a different donor, was that of a
blanket salary increase for all health workers, coupled with
in-kind provision of FHCI-related drugs. Ultimately, the lat-
ter option was agreed on and, while the conflicting agendas
and ideologies of the two donors involved in the debate un-
doubtedly played a role, the choice was justified on the
basis of practical feasibility considerations since a salary in-
crease would take less time to implement and entail lower
transaction costs than PBF.
At this point, the discussion on PBF became detached
from the FHCI planning and from the HRH TWG and
the HRH Directorate, which remained in charge of the
implementation of the salary increase and related reforms
(including managing the payroll and the health workers’
“Attendance Monitoring System” and “Staff Sanctions
Framework”). However, meetings on the PBF design con-
tinued between the World Bank and the Directorate for
Policy, Planning and Information (DPPI) of the MoHS
[19]. In the prevailing narratives, PBF was meant to con-
tribute to the motivation of health workers especially in
terms of quality of service and partially compensate for
the facilities’ loss of income, while the salary supplementa-
tion was seen as compensating the extra workload and the
drug provision to reduce the need to charge fees. The per-
formance focus was in line with the broader Presidential
agenda at the time which also stressed the idea of per-
formance contracting and monitoring at all levels of the
government, for example with the signature of Perform-
ance Management Contracts for senior managers at min-
isterial level [28]. However, these contracts were rarely
enforced and the envisaged Individual Performance Ap-
praisal System (IPAS) for lower-level staff was never im-
plemented (it was again being discussed at the end of
2017 – direct observation).
PBF was strongly supported by the World Bank and
was designed with its financial and technical aid over the
following year. The design envisaged PBF to be intro-
duced nationwide without piloting and making use of
existing structures. This included using public facilities
for the provision of services, District Health Medical
Teams (DHMTs) in collaboration with Local Councils
for verification, supervision and data management at
district level, the Health Financing Unit (HFU) of the
DPPI for the implementation of the PBF reporting and
financing system and the Local Government Finance De-
partment of the Ministry of Finance and Economic De-
velopment (MoFED) for facility payment [29]. The
collaboration with the Local Councils stemmed from the
fact that they are -in theory- responsible for the
provision of healthcare services under the Local Govern-
ment Act of 2004. The PBF scheme, which initially in-
cluded only primary facilitiesb and only six reproductive,
maternal and child health services, was named “Simple
Performance-Based Financing Scheme for Primary
Healthcare”. According to the operational manual, the
aim was to implement the ‘simple’ scheme during a first
phase from 2011 to 2013, to then build on the lessons
learned to “expand to a Comprehensive PBF Scheme
that covers both primary and secondary healthcare ser-
vices at a later date” ([29]: p.viii). The implementation of
the PBF scheme started in April 2011.
Implementation of the national PBF scheme for primary
care (2011–2016)
After its inception, the implementation of PBF continued
with no major revisions to the initial arrangements. For
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example, the plan envisaged in the Operational Manual
to contract an agency (NGO or CSO/Civil Society Or-
ganisation) to provide frequent, independent validation
of PBF performance reports was never put in place. In
addition, a number of challenges started to emerge and
to be informally discussed among stakeholders in the
health sector (mainly, DPPI, DHMTs, NGOs supporting
primary facilities, and health workers), but were rarely if
ever systematically reported.
In March 2013, a corruption scandal emerged con-
cerning the misappropriation of GAVI funds by some
MoHS staff within the DPPI. Twenty-nine people were
formally accused of the crime, lost their jobs [30],
though they were eventually exonerated later on. The
scandal had the unfortunate consequence of leaving the
DPPI and in particular its HFU practically emptied of its
staff, with a loss of institutional memory, operational
capacity and skills. Only relatively junior staff, mostly ex-
ternally paid rather than civil servants and in very low
numbers (1–2 people at times) remained and were in
charge of running the PBF scheme. In the process and
also because the dwindling funding, the original idea to
scale up the ‘simple’ scheme to a ‘comprehensive’ one in
2013 was abandoned and, despite the efforts to review
the implementation and take stock of lessons learned,
for example, in workshops organised in June–October
2013 [31, 32], many challenges remained.
In April 2014, the first PBF external verification was
conducted as planned and the report released [33], by
the Dutch NGO Cordaid, an organisation with
well-established expertise in PBF. One of the key infor-
mants called it an “eye opener” (KII–government actor)
as the report identified a number of fundamental prob-
lems, such as: the considerable difference in number of
services provided and in quality scores between the in-
ternal and external verification; the weaknesses in finan-
cial management; the extremely long (up to 1 year)
delays in payment of the PBF bonus; the weak institu-
tional arrangements that did not allow for a clear separ-
ation of functions (for example, with the DHMT being
at the same time the technical supervisor of facilities
and the verifier); and the insufficient involvement of the
Local Councils which in practice were little engaged and
rarely participated in PBF implementation. With refer-
ence to the weak institutional organisation, the report
states that “in Sierra Leone, a ‘light’ PBF approach is ap-
plied” ([33]:p.69). The review also highlighted positive
aspects of the PBF programme, such as that it had
allowed facilities to directly purchase items to improve
the work environment (more hygiene, better equipped
buildings and better supplies), thus exuding a more nu-
anced and complex understanding of PBF not only as a
way to provide cash to facilities, but also to allow in-
creased management autonomy.
The elements (both positive and negative) identified in
the external verification are echoed in the interviews car-
ried out at central and district level for this research, and
are similar to the views of health workers captured in earl-
ier studies [21, 34]. In particular, respondents stressed
that, despite the fact that PBF made a difference by pro-
viding extra cash at a time when “fund flow was limited
from the MoHS” (KII-government actor), a number of im-
plementation challenges limited its impact. These in-
cluded weak financial and managerial procedures and lack
of transparency, both in sharing the payment between staff
and in using it, as well as possible corrupt practices at all
levels (including central, district and facility), issues related
to the challenges in the banking system (e.g., lack of facil-
ities’ accounts, wrong bank details, general weakness of
the banking system, errors in entering information, etc.)
and delays in payment. The latter were seen as demotivat-
ing and delinking payment from performance. This im-
pression was compounded by the widespread perception
of the PBF payment as a sort of salary (rather than an in-
centive) for the majority of health staff, in particular for
the unsalaried volunteers [35]. Additionally, many staff at
facility but also at district level appeared not aware about
how the payment was calculated [36]. Some interviewees
also noted that very limited data, analyses, information
and research were available on PBF and its effectiveness,
beyond views and perceptions. While many PBF pro-
grammes have been subject to rigorous impact evaluations
[4], the scheme in Sierra Leone did not have such mecha-
nisms so that extremely limited evidence exists, based on
the external reviews [33, 35], a one-off analysis carried out
internally [37], and a qualitative study [21].
During the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in
2014–2015, PBF continued to function in the sense that
payments were made to providers based on the monthly
HMIS report, but the internal verification was sus-
pended since DHMTs could not visit facilities ([38];
KIIs). However, extreme delays in payment and other
implementation challenges affecting the programme
continued. Additionally, around 6 million USD from
PBF funds were reallocated by the World Bank to the
EVD emergency response (KIIs), which accelerated the
impending end of the project.
Design, implementation and discontinuation of PBF PLUS
(2015)
Building on their involvement in the external review,
Cordaid with the MoHS started planning the launch of a
new (pilot) PBF scheme around 2014. Based on their
own definition of the national PBF as “light PBF”
([39]:p.18), the new programme was named “PBF PLUS”
and its aim was to propose a new design to address the
challenges identified in (what became known as) “PBF
Light”. In order to do so, PBF PLUS envisaged more
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complex institutional arrangements, for example with
the creation of a “Performance Purchasing Assistance
Team” at district level in charge of verification, coaching
of facilities, and assistance in the preparation of facilities’
business plans. The project included primary facilities,
but also the district hospital and provided payments for
more services than PBF Light (18 for primary facilities
compared to the previous 6), as well as clearer incentives
and indicators for DHMTs performance [39]. Similarly
to NGO-implemented PBF pilots in other settings [2], it
also aimed at creating a narrative of PBF success. In par-
ticular, in Sierra Leone PBF PLUS was meant to act “as a
catalyser” for health system strengthening, in an envir-
onment where PBF was increasingly seen as not func-
tional and about to be discontinued. Following
participation in an international PBF course which
highlighted the challenges of the ongoing programme
and despite the EVD epidemic, PBF PLUS was designed
in early 2015 and briefly implemented with Dutch fund-
ing in Bombali districtc from May to October 2015 [39].
Although judged successful by the implementers [40],
PBF PLUS lasted for an extremely short period of time.
Cordaid had hoped to raise profile and funding by shift-
ing the narrative to that of a ‘successful’ PBF, also in light
of the upcoming renegotiation of the World
Bank-funded national PBF (see below). It was hoped to
influence the political dialogue at the highest levels and
muster the support of “PBF champions” at the MoHS
and the MoFED (the office doors of many key actors in-
volved in PBF PLUS have a sticker identifying them as
part of the “PBF family”). However, this did not work as
planned and Cordaid lost some of their political clout
over time (KIIs). Additionally -or perhaps as a conse-
quence- an alternative narrative about PBF PLUS
emerged which was repeated by many respondents, and
focused on the fact that PBF PLUS’ implementation at
about 2 USD per capita in subsidies only [40] was too
costly compared to the national PBF scheme at 0.4 USD
per capita [41] and therefore unsustainable.
“It (PBF PLUS) was nicely set up, but not sustainable
because it was too expensive and also, they (Cordaid)
had lost the … I don’t know if it was personality-related.
Because they had such a short time to implement, they
pushed a lot of things through the Ministry where the
Ministry would have wanted more time, but the time
was not there, so I think they lost credibility, and
trust and relationship with the Ministry in that
process” (KII-government actor).
“It is obvious that there were opposing views in the
Ministry between different departments, between
individuals. (…) [Cordaid] has been dealing with the
PBF unit [HFU], whereas maybe the real decisions
were made at a different level” (KII- non-government
actor).
As presciently warned in PBF PLUS’ Project Imple-
mentation Manual, “a funding gap in 2016 will (have an)
effect on the credibility of the health system and PBF in
particular” ([39]:p.29).
Discontinuation of national PBF and ongoing discussion
(2016–2017)
In the meanwhile, the implementation of the national PBF
scheme continued up until the end of the World Bank
funding in early 2016. Informally, the potential extension
of PBF was discussed by some stakeholders, such as
WHO [42]. However, these discussions happened in the
immediate post-EVD phase, when political priority has
shifted to infectious disease control and to the Presidential
Recovery Priorities, which did not include health financing
and PBF [43]. Additionally, the landscape in the health
sector was particularly fragmented given the sudden
arrival of many international donors and NGOs with di-
verging agendas and different degrees of contextual know-
ledge and understanding. At the time, the prevalent
narrative on PBF was stuck between the acknowledged
problems of the national scheme and the costs of PBF
PLUS framed as high and unsustainable. Evidence was
mostly used in a negative way, by stressing the lack of it as
justification for discontinuation (direct observation).
Overall, no clear and explicit decision was taken about
the discontinuation and/or the future of PBF at the time
– a key informant called it a ‘non-decision’ (KII-govern-
ment actor). The unfavourable timing of the end of the
PBF project (in the midst of the post-Ebola recovery) is
one possible reason for the lack of renegotiation talks to
ensure new funding and avoid PBF discontinuation.
Additionally, it appears that the political support for PBF
faltered from both the MoHS and the World Bank. From
the MoHS side, the views were not unanimous (as dis-
cussed below), and while the DPPI was generally sup-
porting the continuation of the programme, others
(individuals or departments) were less enthusiastic. One
view shared by some informants is that PBF’s challenges,
the unclear flow of funds, the complaints and tensions it
had created (in particular at hospital level: the hospitals
not included in the scheme were vocally complaining
while in the pilot tertiary hospitals, staff has threatened
to strike because of the way PBF was shared among
personnel was perceived as unfair) had made PBF polit-
ically risky especially in the run-up to the 2018 general
elections (KIIs). At the same time, the World Bank had
a new team responsible for the health sector in Sierra
Leone and (possibly) interested in distancing themselves
from the previous project, which was perceived as
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unsuccessful. As one respondent said, “they’d rather just
let it (PBF) die and restart again” (KII-government
actor).
Indeed, discussions for the next iteration of PBF started
again not much later, around early 2017 and were ongoing
at the time of data collection in November 2017 (direct
observation). Although details were not yet defined, the
focus of the discussion was on the launch of a pilot PBF
scheme in two districts under a fully revised design.
Drivers of the policy process: The interplay of agency,
structure and frames
Agency: Actors, interests, agendas and power relations
The MoHS certainly was a central actor in the policy
process described above, although it is clear that deci-
sions were for a large part driven by external actors. In
particular, the MoHS’ ability to lead and drive policy
making appears to be limited by two main factors. The
first relates to the lack of capacity within the MoHS, the
DPPI and in particular the HFU, before but even more
starkly after the GAVI scandal, in terms of both number
of staff and skill sets, as there are very few health econo-
mists or health financing experts in country. Lack of
capacity is likely related to the historical legacies (dis-
cussed below) of the protracted conflict and
socio-economic disruption as well as the low income
status of the country, which have hampered the develop-
ment of specialised academic facilities in the country.
The lack of capacity in the public service is compounded
by the fact that civil servants are poorly paid and some-
times unpaid, and many prefer other careers. Many re-
spondents discussed the lack of capacity at MoHS level:
“Because of lack of leadership, [and] lack of capacity
at central level, everything just crumbled like that”
(KII-government actor).
“They don’t have the leadership capacity to run a unit
like that. The problem was that kind of capacity is
hard to find. (…) They are about to embark on a
radically complex set of (health financing) reforms at
the same time, and there is literally no one in this
country, no one who understands how to put all these
things together” (KII- non-government actor).
The second element relates to the fact that the MoHS
is rarely a cohesive entity, and views, interests and
agendas, but also political weight and access to resources
and power, differ between directorates, programmes and
individuals. The MoHS often seems to work in silos and
conduct “parallel conversations” (KII- non-government
actor) based on bilateral relations between a programme
or directorate and a specific donor. Some suggested that,
in the context of extremely scarce resources (where, for
example, some central-level staff work as unsalaried ‘vol-
unteers’) a key driver of many choices relates to
rent-seeking opportunities. In this context, the PBF
programme (and the potential rent-seeking opportunities
related to it) was seen by many as the fiefdom of the
DPPI, while others in the MoHS were excluded, in par-
ticular because a “central-level PBF” which could have
distributed financial incentives more widely was dis-
cussed but never took off. Additionally, some key infor-
mants mentioned that those managing PBF were seen as
quite powerful before the GAVI scandal, and it is pos-
sible that in the aftermath of it, a political choice was
made to leave it rather weak and devoid of leadership
and technical capacity.
“The DPPI was managing (PBF) and kind of keeping
it from the rest of the Ministry. (…) There was a lot of
money attached to it. It’s unclear if there were
kickbacks or what exactly the issues were…” (KII-
government actor).
“Even in the past, the design of PBF it seems to
happen more or less in isolation, it’s not properly
connected to other things, and that might also
undermine the support for it because, yes, you know,
if you’re not involved or you don’t feel involved, how
are you going to support something like that?” (KII-
non-government actor).
“PBF was not benefitting people at the helm of things
(…), so to some extent for them, the project is not
viable” (KII-government actor).
“A story is sometimes suggested that there hasn’t
been buy-in from central level into PBF because the
central level wasn’t benefitting from it (…). There is
this section in the Operational Manual for the central
level PBF, and that’s designed to be a payment to
central level staff for having operating PBF (…), so
yes, the situation is that the government didn’t want
to agree because progress wasn’t being made on the
central level PBF” (KII-government actor).
“At our centre here, we are going to advocate for us to
also receive incentives. We had issues about the
indicators so it never took off” (KII-government actor).
At central level, the political landscape goes beyond
the MoHS and is further fragmented. In particular, the
influence of the President’s decisions and priorities has
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much shaped policy making in the health sector, in par-
ticular at the time of the FHCI [44]. While a ‘performance’
focus has been high on the agenda of the (then) President
in the early 2010s (though less in the following years), PBF
was only partially framed under and aligned to that
agenda. The Presidential priority for health financing was
focused on the creation of the Sierra Leone Social Health
Insurance (SLeSHI). The discussion on it has been on-
going since 2008 under the leadership of the MoHS, but
was put aside during the FHCI reforms (KII –
non-government actor). Later on, around 2015, the Minis-
try of Labour and Social Security was given the lead in the
debate and made some progress on the design. SLeSHI
was official launched just weeks before the 2018 general
elections [45], though the scheme is not yet operational.
“Sierra Leone is very political in that if the President
makes it his priority then it’s going to get done, like the
free healthcare was his priority, so it’s done. SLeSHI is
his drive, like he wants to have it done. PBF is not, it’s
driven by donors, maybe the Ministry, so that then just
falls under the knife” (KII-government actor).
“The government’s focus is not on PBF. At
Presidential level, it’s on the health insurance scheme.
The Bank wanted the focus of the government to be
on PBF. So there was a disconnect. At the end of the
day, [they] were not singing from the same hymn
sheet” (KII-government actor).
“There is a huge political polarisation between
SLeSHI and PBF, Ministry of Labour and Ministry of
Health. There’s a big uncertainty around what is going
to happen after elections next year” (KII – non-
government actor).
A similar fragmentation was observed within the Min-
istry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED).
The department involved in PBF was the Local Govern-
ment Finance Department (LGFD) in charge of making
the payments to facilities, and which appeared closely in-
volved in the processes and debates around PBF and
supporting it, while other departments were rather ab-
sent in the debate.
Sub-national levels played a less prominent role, with
their views mostly neglected. Local Councils were sup-
posed to actively engage in both PBF schemes as fund
holders and verifiers (the latter only in the nationwide
PBF), but were in practice rarely involved and did not
see their interest in the scheme (KIIs). This is also be-
cause the decentralisation process in Sierra Leone is only
partially achieved and in practice Councils have limited
oversight of, and limited technical and financial capacity
to manage the health sector. At the same time, DHMTs
were struggling to fulfil the role within the national PBF
scheme, both because of lack of adequate funding and
human resources (for example, DHMTs were supposed
to verify up to 130 facilities each quarter, on top of their
other duties [36]). As a result, they were not totally in
support of PBF, although during the interviews some
highlighted its importance in terms of providing re-
sources for facilities. Similarly, providers’ views were
rarely taken into consideration in the national-level de-
bates. The Sierra Leone Medical and Dental Board has
been involved in the policy dialogue about PBF, but is
seen by many of the managers and providers in the
frontlines as a “social club” (KII – government actor),
powerful but not representative of their views.
Among the external actors, the World Bank appeared to
be the main driver of PBF’s adoption and implementation,
by introducing the concept in Sierra Leone, promoting it
and providing technical and financial assistance, in line
with its prominent role in supporting and funding PBF at
global level, usually through the HRITF. However, the na-
tionwide PBF in Sierra Leone only partially benefitted from
HRITF funding, with 5 million USD provided starting
from 2013, while starting in 2011 the bulk of the funding
for the “Reproductive and Child Health Project – Phase 2”
(RCHP2) under which PBF was implemented came from
the Africa Catalytic Growth Fund (a trust fund funded by
the UK and Spain - 25.7 million USD) and IDA funding
(13 million USD) [4]. This may in part explain the lack of
assessment (impact evaluations are compulsory for
HRITF-funded programmes) and in general the lower level
of scrutiny of the project. In addition, the team leaders in
charge of the health sector projects for the World Bank
changed over the period analysed with a particularly high
turnover (our calculation based on direct observation is
that there have been at least 4 team leaders over the
2010–2017 period) and none has been permanently based
in Freetown. A respondent stressed this, saying,
“You’ve got turnover within the Ministry, but also
you’ve got turnover of staff within the World Bank… I
don’t know, I wonder to what extent the lessons of
RCHP2 have actually been internalised by those who
are working on it now” (KII-government actor).
The role of other donors seems to be less prominent.
Indeed, apart from the animated debate during the FHCI
preparation in which different donors supported a salary
supplementation against PBF [19], once PBF had become
separate from the immediate FHCI reforms and was dis-
cussed bilaterally between World Bank and DPPI, other
donors mostly remained bystanders of the design and
implementation processes. One of the reasons may again
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be related to the high turnover among representatives
that does not allow for familiarity with the complexities
of the health system strengthening activities, how they
work and interact at implementation level and the differ-
ent actors involved. Also, the technical capacity on
health financing issues available in country is rather lim-
ited even among donors and international organisations.
Indeed, no government partner, including the World
Bank, had full-time staff based in Sierra Leone who are
health financing experts. As an exception, during the
post-EVD period, the WHO set up a Health System
Strengthening unit within the Sierra Leone country of-
fice, which included a health financing specialist and
took part in the discussion about the future of PBF when
the nationwide programme was about to end. However,
the unit was donor-funded and did not last long. By the
end of 2017, no staff was in charge solely of health sys-
tem strengthening or health financing. The absence of
health system strengthening specialisation is not unique
to Sierra Leone and similar to many WHO country of-
fices [46]. Finally, respondents stressed that donors seem
to have a myopic agenda focused on ‘their’ projects,
which results in a fragmented landscape of projects only
partially coordinated at national level and very disjointed
at sub-national level [20].
“They (the donors) are not interested. I think donors
also benefit, they can come in with their own little
area of intervention they want to do. No one is
interested in health financing because they don’t see
the benefit of it” (KII-government actor).
“Maybe this chaos is in the interest of the people
who have decision-making power now” (KII- non-
government actor).
Similarly, with the exception of Cordaid, NGOs did
not play a substantial role in the policy dialogue around
PBF. This is because most NGOs were not directly in-
volved in the design and implementation of PBF and
many remained sceptical about PBF or were openly op-
posing it on ideological grounds. At local level in dis-
tricts and facilities, PBF mostly operated in parallel with
NGO activities, although a few instances of collaboration
were highlighted where NGOs supported DHMTs for
verification activities and provided specific coaching to
facilities on indicators and practices related to PBF [20].
Structure: Contextual features, historical legacies, disrupting
events and imposed timing
The actors described above interact among themselves
to shape the policy dialogue, but are also influenced by
the structure around them, which includes historical
legacies, contextual features and specific events and tim-
ings. The recent history of Sierra Leone and the pro-
longed civil war but also the colonial and post-colonial
periods left a legacy of poverty and inequality, which in
turn have shaped the context in ways which have an in-
fluence on policy making [19]. Relevant for us are, in
particular, the lack of opportunities for education and
even more for specialised education, which lead to weak
technical capacity. As a consequence, there is a lack of
understanding of technically complex concepts and re-
forms such as PBF, not only in terms of the nuances of
its role within the broader health financing architecture,
but also in terms of basic functioning (especially at
sub-national level, among DHMTs and PHUs). Another
consequence is that the time and skills available for as-
sessment and evaluation of policies and reforms are lim-
ited, so that data and evidence are scarce or absent.
Another relevant contextual feature is the financial de-
pendency of Sierra Leone on aid funding. The National
Health Accounts for 2013 revealed that a quarter
(24.4%) of the total health expenditure of 95 USD per
capita is contributed by development partners with an
additional 7.2% by non-governmental organisations. The
bulk of it is composed of out-of-pocket expenditures
(61.6%) and only a minimal part is contributed by the
government (6.8%) [47].
Lack of capacity, of data and evidence, and (arguably
most importantly) of funds have profound effect on the
policy processes. The consequence is that Sierra Leone
is vulnerable to the influence of those providing funds,
which are often tied to the design and implementation
of specific reforms.
“The underlying governance mechanisms are
completely lacking, right? I mean, the government
says ‘yes’ to everybody! (…) Whoever is interest in
doing it, they can develop their strategy. I’m not sure
how much government ownership… I mean, I
wouldn’t even say ownership, just how much interest
the government has sometimes in its own sector”
(KII- non-government actor).
“You’re running an economy that is always donor
driven, which is to say if donors do not provide
support in certain areas, nothing happens, you know?
So it’s so difficult to have control over your own
destiny when you cannot actually provide for yourself
and most times, the donors come and they have their
own agenda, they have their plans, they can ask you
questions but they still have their plans and (…) if
your plan does not align with the donor’s plan then it
is either you lose it or you find a way to aligning your
plan to that donor, because, as they say, who pays the
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piper calls for the tune a lot of the time” (KII-
government actor).
In this context, disrupting events both at small scale
(such as removal of experienced staff in the aftermath of
the GAVI scandal) or at very large, national scale (such as
the tragedy of the EVD outbreak) are likely to have major
knock-on effects in the already fragile environment.
In the PBF policy process described above, Sierra Leo-
nean institutions had not only limited capacity and pos-
sibility of pushing back or promoting issues, but also of
changing the pace and timing of certain decisions. While
the launch of the FHCI is one example where the timing
of a reform was decided internally, other key moments
in PBF decision-making (such as the introduction of
PBF PLUS, the debate at the end of the national PBF
scheme, and the ongoing redesign) happened at times
that are defined by outside dynamics related to donors’
funding cycle and deadline imposed by their aid dis-
bursement modalities. In those cases, the consequences
appear to be sub-optimal. The discussion on the future
of the first PBF scheme, for example, was carried out in
the immediate aftermath of the EVD epidemic when pri-
orities, capacity and funds were absorbed and distracted
away from health financing issues. Similarly, the ongoing
discussion on the next World Bank-funded PBF is pur-
sued under the frame of the Global Funding Facility
(GFF), a recently set up World Bank-managed trust fund
[48], which, as pointed out in one interview, surely had a
role in restarting the debate around PBF:
“With Sierra Leone becoming a GFF country early in
the year, I’m sure that sort of lit a fire as well in terms
of what needs to happen around health financing, and
there was a sort of increased pressure to get PBF in
the context of the GFF also more strengthened, I’d
say. (…) The GFF provided an added push for new
PBF discussions” (KII- non-government actor).
Frames, ideas, meanings, names and narratives
To strengthen our understanding of the policy process
on PBF, it is interesting to look beyond agency and
structure and their interactions, and also draw attention
to the frames, ideas, meanings and narratives that are
used to define, understand and talk about a fundamen-
tally technical concept such as PBF.
Our analysis highlights how the framing of PBF has
evolved over time. Initially, the narrative around PBF fo-
cused around HRH issues and PBF was framed as an
extra payment to contribute to the motivation and the
performance of health workers (partially in line with the
‘performance’ agenda of the President), with a focus on
quality of services, while the salary supplementation
included under the FHCI was seen as dealing with extra
workload.
“During the designing we thought, [...] we have now
increased salaries for our health workers. What that
means, we are looking at the quantity of services, but
in terms of quality, can we look at the quality aspect
of it? […] So […] we talked about the performance-
based financing […]” (KII-government actor).
Another perspective started to emerge in the PBF nar-
rative, which links less to the ‘incentive effect’ and more
to the ‘income effect’ and the possibility of increasing
funding at facility level, taking over the policy of provid-
ing cash to facilities, which was short lived and briefly
implemented.
“What we did was, before we launched the free
healthcare, we brought in the idea of upgrading the
facilities. We agree that, ‘ok let’s start giving them
what we call “cash to facility”, ok’, and [...] we develop
guidelines on how to use that cash to facility basically
to upgrade their facilities [...]. Basic things, like
toiletries, curtains, you name them. [...] And then we
used the “cash for facility” as a window of opportunity
for PBF to enter” (KII-government actor).
Overtime, the focus on the incentive effect and on
health workers’ performance was gradually lost both be-
cause of the shifting agenda and narratives at central
level, but also because of the increasing delays in PBF
payment, which delinked it from the actual performance,
and as it was perceived as a substitute for payment, es-
pecially for unsalaried staff.
Later on, through the external evaluation and the
introduction of PBF PLUS, Cordaid conveyed a broader
understanding of PBF not only in relation to its incen-
tive and income effects, but also in relation to better
working conditions, increased management autonomy,
transparency and accountability. In the design of PBF
PLUS, Cordaid explicitly aimed at framing the technical
concept of PBF in a much wider way than previously
done in Sierra Leone, stating for example that, “PBF is
more than just a financing scheme, it is a whole system
strengthening approach. […] A properly designed PBF
PLUS scheme will lead to improvements in all areas of
the health sector” ([39]: p.5). Even the change in naming
of PBF with the existing scheme labelled as ‘Light’ in
contrast to the proposed ‘Plus’ represented an explicit
attempt to shift the narrative.
“Based on those conclusions (of the external
evaluation) the idea came to do a project, a more
‘fully fledged’ implementation type of PBF. (…) Let’s
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see if the Cordaid approach gives a different
experience from [the nationwide] PBF, which will
became then the Light versus the PBF PLUS. Those
names actually didn’t exist before…” (KII- non-
government actor).
However, Cordaid’s attempt to create a new,
country-specific ‘success story’ does not appear success-
ful, and in fact the implementation of PBF PLUS was
seen by many as the declaration of failure of ‘PBF Light’.
As one informant stated, at that time,
“I think, the focus was a lot on the problems rather
than the good things about PBF” (KII-government
actor).
The lack of rigorous evidence on both PBF projects
did not help either in the process of shifting the narra-
tive and creating a new story,
“There was a time when we shall have showcase for
PBF. But you cannot showcase when you do not have
a baseline. (…) What I’m saying is, if you have a
baseline, then you will be able to tell a story” (KII-
government actor).
During the debate on the discontinuation (or not) of
PBF and in the discussions as of the end of 2017 on a
new model, some external actors had adopted a broader
understanding of PBF, more closely linked to health fi-
nancing strategies and strategic purchasing and started
framing it in that way (see for example, WHO [42]).
However, the prevailing way in which PBF was under-
stood, especially by MoHS staff and health workers, still
focused on the cash it provided to facilities and the pay-
ment for health workers, unrelated to performance.
Additionally, very few or no links were made to other
aspects of PBF, such as the increased autonomy and ac-
countability and as an integral element of the wider
health financing architecture, so that the new discourse
was grounded in old narratives narrowly related to in-
creased income for staff and facilities.
“(PBF) is a form of motivational scheme” (KII-
government actor).
“I really liked (PBF) because for me it was basically
sending around a lot of money across the country”
(KII-government actor).
“I would describe (PBF’s understanding) as motivation
and as the only source of money at health facility.
Over and over again we hear that. (…) Some people
are big on the incentives and some people are big on
there needs to be money to invest in the facilities”
(KII- non-government actor).
“A lot of people just see it as some extra money for
the staff. And also people think they are entitled to it,
kind of. (…) So it gets completely turned, people even
think that this is kind of a salary, but it’s not” (KII-
non-government actor).
Although the World Bank team describes PBF as a piece
of a complex picture and, in the discussions around the
new PBF scheme, has actively promoted and supported a
dialogue with Ministry of Labour and Social Security’s unit
working on SLeSHI (direct observation at meeting – No-
vember 2017), other parts of the health financing puzzle,
such as the free healthcare, are excluded from the narra-
tive, at least in the way it is framed for the benefit of the
local counterparts. As one respondent said,
“PBF is linked to the FHCI. I mean, we don’t talk
about it in that way. But the fact that facilities do not
charge a sizable number of clients, means that PBF
has to be built to accommodate that” (KII- non-
government actor, emphasis added).
Discussion
The study faced some limitations in terms of data collec-
tion and analysis. Concerning the first, we recognise that
our sample of key informants is biased towards the cen-
tral level. Although efforts have been made to include
DHMT actors in the most recent round of interviews,
the sub-national levels are not well represented and the
information from NGOs, Local Councils, facility staff re-
fers to previous rounds of data collection. Additionally,
our sample is focused mostly on governmental actors,
and there are fewer international partners included,
reflecting the difficulties in engaging with some of the
donors around issues concerning health financing in Si-
erra Leone, as well as the lack of in-country technical
expertise. In terms of analysis, our position as ‘insiders’
within the health financing debates in Sierra Leone
(though some authors are positioned more closely to the
study setting than others) bears both advantages and dis-
advantages. On the one hand, as insiders we were able
to access the political environment and key actors, and
ask meaningful questions on sensitive issues. However,
on the other hand, we may have some inherent bias and
prejudices arising from the close connection with the re-
search subject [49]. To mitigate the potential limitations,
throughout the research process, we attempted to be
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explicit and systematic in the analysis process, actively
reflecting on our positionality and discussing findings
and analysis between authors.
Our analysis of the policy process through the lens of
actors’ relations, contextual and structural features, frames
and framing points to a number of key factors that af-
fected the trajectory. One of the emerging driving factors
is the strong influence of external actors, and in particular
projects’ funders, which -we found- is exercised across the
elements of the analytical framework. This finding is in
line with the existing research on the adoption and imple-
mentation of PBF in low-income countries, which recog-
nises a common feature in the strong influence of donors,
and in particular of the World Bank, in a number of coun-
tries, including Tanzania, Cameroon and Chad [2, 13–15,
18, 50, 51]. The case of Chad is particularly relevant as it
shares with Sierra Leone the start-stop nature of PBF im-
plementation. There, a recent study [18] stressed how the
high turnover of staff at MoH and donors, the top-down
nature of the introduction of PBF championed by the
World Bank, the non-inclusive implementation processes,
and the lack of technical skills at national level resulted in
weak ownership of PBF and eventually its discontinuation,
despite funding being available. Other studies on PBF and
other health financing reforms [13, 52] unpacked the
routes of influence that donors utilise and pointed to the
control of financial resources and of technical expertise as
critical mechanisms and stressed the unequal power that
underlie the relations between national governments and
external donors. In particular, the World Bank plays an
important role as “[it] has a comparative advantage over
WHO given its access to ministries of finance, its staff ex-
pertise in measurement, its broad multisectorial portfolio
and its lending power” ([53]: p.1). The latter, in particular,
allows the Bank to back its ideas about health projects and
policies with resources for implementation [54]. The
downside of this is that the balance of power is easily
skewed in the Bank’s favour to the detriment of national
ownership and leadership.
In Sierra Leone, we highlighted similar external influ-
ences in the PBF policy process. Additionally, dynamics
internal to the MoHS also played a role. Indeed, within
the resource-strapped environment of the MoHS,
rent-seeking was reported by a few KI as a driver of
interest and support in PBF, so that those directly in-
volved in the project (DPPI, LGFD/MoFED) and poten-
tially gaining from it in monetary terms or in terms of
power and influence, appeared supportive of PBF, while
others (other MoHS directorates, hospitals not included
in the scheme, etc.) were opposed to it, either genuinely
or precisely because of their exclusion. At the same time,
donors with little or no incentive to align and coordinate
their activities fostered ‘parallel conversations’ with the
MoHS. For example, the ‘venue shopping’ strategy [55]
adopted -deliberately or not- by the World Bank to
move the PBF negotiations bilaterally with the DPPI,
once the salary supplementation option had prevailed
during the HRH Technical Working Group discussions,
proved successful in the immediate term as PBF was de-
signed and implemented. However, it had an unexpected
consequence in the volatile context of Sierra Leone. The
removal of experienced staff from the DPPI resulted in
weakened implementation, created tensions and discon-
tent from other directorates and led to the loss of polit-
ical support for PBF.
Additionally, our analytical framework is helpful in iden-
tifying mechanisms through which the influence is exerted
also in relation to the structural elements. Historical and
structural legacies shape the context of policy making on
health financing in Sierra Leone (including and beyond
PBF) in a way that is much defined by the lack of domestic
funding and aid dependency. In addition to their influence
through financial support, Khan et al. [52] note how do-
nors also control the timing of the availability of resources
to run programmes, thus influencing policy implementa-
tion and leading to sudden starts and stops in some cases.
This is similar to what was observed in Sierra Leone, where
‘actual frames’ (as opposed to the metaphorical frames, dis-
cussed below) defined by donors’ funding arrangements
and cycles dictated the timing and pace of the policy nego-
tiations, as well as the duration of implementation, and
shaped the political space available for influence from ex-
ternal donors. As a consequence, the policy debate is often
run at an accelerated pace, which does not allow for the
development of national understanding, leadership and
ownership over the design of programmes, which others
have shown are essential for the ‘institutionalisation phase’
and the long-term political sustainability of PBF [15].
When the externally-driven opening of a window for policy
discussion coincides with a (internally) politically sensitive
time or a disrupting event, change is unlikely to happen or
to be driven by national concerns and dynamics.
Finally, we explored how metaphorical frames, i.e., the
narratives, ideas, meanings and even names attached to
PBF, have evolved and shaped its trajectory over time.
Most evidently, the attempt, through the initiation of
PBF PLUS, to create a successful story of effective PBF
did not work as planned, and possibly had the opposite
effect, because of other factors playing out at the time.
As Cordaid recognised, this made it more difficult to
avoid the discontinuation of the national PBF once its
funding ended. The attempt was not only unsuccessful
in terms of creating a new 'success' narrative, but also
did not achieve the hoped-for change in the framing and
understanding of PBF from a focus on the incentive and
income effect to other or all PBF effects. For instance,
the emphasis on the potential to enhance transparency
and reduce corruption (‘accountability effect’) which is
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noted as key frame in other settings [13, 15, 56], did not
emerge in Sierra Leone, and neither did a broader
‘health system reform’ narrative. Our findings suggest a
dissonance in the framing of the same concept. On the
one hand, many (national) actors framed PBF focusing
on motivation and additional resources, while on the
other hand, some (mostly external) actors saw it as a
critical piece of the health financing reform – at least in
their internal discourse, while they preferred to align the
public discourse to the local narrative. Such dissonance
in framing may hamper local appropriation and be dam-
aging in the long run. When the conflicting frames will
eventually become explicit, they risk blocking further
progress in the appropriation and adaptation of the con-
cept and limiting the political sustainability of a re-
form, which can be perceived as top-down and
externally-imposed, as happened in Chad [18].
In the analysis of the framing processes, this study adds
to previous work by stressing the role and use of frames
not only as rhetorical devices to ‘sell’ the PBF concept
[15], but also, in a more interpretive way, as meaning, in-
terpretation and understanding based on individuals’
background, skills, previous experience of it, as well as
core beliefs [57, 58]. This is particularly relevant for a con-
cept that is ideologically-charged such as PBF and at the
centre of heated debates globally [10, 59].
Conclusions
In this study, we explored the drivers of the introduction
and implementation, discontinuation and possible re-
introduction of PBF programmes in Sierra Leone. Our
aim was to understand the influence of power relations,
incentives, resources and ideas on the trajectory of a
very important national health financing policy, such as
PBF. We did so by using an adapted political economy
framework focusing on the interplay between actors,
structures and framing.
The pertinence of our findings points to the relevance
of studying and better understanding agenda setting and
decision making processes, using qualitative and inter-
pretive approaches. While the retrospective view that we
adopt has an analytical advantage, it is important that
the lessons learned are given careful attention in a pro-
spective way in order to guide practice. Coordination
and alignment between and among different actors (i.e.,
government at different levels and multiple donors) is
certainly no simple task. Power relations and resource
issues will be difficult to overcome, in particular in re-
source- and capacity-constrained settings. However, our
analysis suggests that other elements may be possible to
deal with and could lead to more positive outcomes. In
particular, we stress that adopting broad and shared
frames to ensure a common, agreed, inclusive under-
standing of technical concepts may be useful to ensure
the ownership and political sustainability of (health fi-
nancing and other) reforms. Similarly, in addition to
shared metaphorical frames, the ‘actual frames’ which
define the negotiation process and the implementation
period of projects and reforms should remain flexible,
allowing for disrupting events (in particular in crisis-
prone contexts), but also for the time and investment
necessary for national capacity to develop. In this sense,
an unhurried dialogue to co-develop consensual frames
may take time (and may not fit with the current struc-
tures of funding and negotiation cycles), but could
ensure longer-term national ownership, political support
and better health system integration.
Endnotes
1In fact, the concept of PBF had already begun circu-
lating in a working paper prepared by the Royal Tropical
Institute, Amsterdam (KIT) with the local NGO MRC at
the time of the FHCI preparation. However, those insti-
tutions did not have funding available to support the
proposal. b In April 2012, two tertiary hospitals for ma-
ternal and pediatric care were added as a pilot project,
with a new set of indicators and incentive calculations. c
At the time, Bombali was EVD-free.
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